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Science-intensive  ﬁrms  are experimenting  with  ‘open  data’  initiatives,  involving  collaboration  with  aca-
demic  scientists  whereby  all results  are  published  with  no  restriction.  Firms  seeking  to beneﬁt  from  open
data  face  two key  challenges:  revealing  R&D  problems  may  leak  valuable  information  to competitors,  and
academic  scientists  may  lack  motivation  to  address  problems  posed  by  ﬁrms.  We  explore  how  ﬁrms  over-
come  these  challenges  through  an inductive  study  of  the  Structural  Genomics  Consortium.  We  ﬁnd  that
the  operation  of  the  consortium  as  a  boundary  organization  provided  two  core  mechanisms  to  address
the  above  challenges.  First,  through  mediated  revealing,  the  boundary  organization  allowed  ﬁrms  to  dis-ndustrial R&D
elective revealing
oundary organization
niversity–industry relations
pen innovation
esearch partnership
close R&D  problems  while  minimizing  adverse  competitive  consequences.  Second,  by  enabling  multiple
goals  the  boundary  organization  increased  the  attractiveness  of industry-informed  agendas  for  academic
scientists.  We  work  our  results  into  a  grounded  model  of  boundary  organizations  as  a vehicle for open
data  initiatives.  Our  study  contributes  to research  on public–private  research  partnerships,  knowledge
revealing  and  boundary  organizations.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license‘All human genomic sequence information (. . .)  should be freely
available and in the public domain in order to encourage
research and development and to maximise its beneﬁt to soci-
ety’ (Human Genome Project, 1996).
. Introduction
The above quote expresses the ‘open data’ rule that consti-
uted a cornerstone of the Human Genome Project. The disclosure
egime of this large-scale research programme was  built on the
rinciple of free, unrestricted and timely access to research ﬁnd-
ngs for all interested parties (Murray-Rust, 2008; Molloy, 2011).
n the Human Genome Project, public science was  pitched against
or-proﬁt entities with competing projects based on proprietary
ntellectual property (Williams, 2010). Yet increasingly ﬁrms them-
elves participate in and even instigate open data initiatives, either
y releasing data to academic communities with no restriction or
y supporting the generation of open data. Partnerships sponsored
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 207 594 1955.
E-mail addresses: m.perkmann@imperial.ac.uk (M.  Perkmann),
enri.schildt@aalto.ﬁ (H. Schildt).
1 Tel.: +358 50 413 9442.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.12.006
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
by pharmaceutical companies, such as the SNP2 consortium and
the Genetic Association Information Network (GAIN) have made
their data publicly available (Cook-Deegan, 2007; Pincock, 2007;
Allarakhia and Walsh, 2011).
Partnerships with universities, aided by public or charity grants,
are natural territory for open data practices, given the prominence
that public knowledge creation has in the norms and traditions of
academic science (Dasgupta and David, 1994). The propagators of
open data in corporate R&D argue that by integrating their R&D
programmes more closely with those of open academic communi-
ties, ﬁrms may reap signiﬁcant beneﬁts for both the quality and the
volume of their innovation activity (Melese et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, participation in open data partnerships with uni-
versities is likely to complicate ﬁrms’ attempts to capture value
from research. A ﬁrst challenge is that ﬁrms may fear that pro-
prietary information about their R&D agendas and technologies is
publicly disclosed (Alexy et al., 2013), given that open data initia-
tives operate with minimum intellectual property protection and
disclose all research results with no restriction. The second chal-
lenge, from a ﬁrm’s viewpoint, is to motivate outsiders to work
on problems that are valuable to the ﬁrm, without being able to
2 SNPs are ‘single nucleotide polymorphisms’. They indicate possible mutations
of  a gene, and can be used as disease markers.
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 earch 
o
a
u
a
s
p
a
b
t
a
h
I
w
d
i
t
t
p
b
t
t
t
d
k
m
c
m
o
o
b
u
ﬁ
c
g
e
t
s
g
d
a
a
h
i
r
t
t
i
a
s
2
r
(
c
r
s
a134 M. Perkmann, H. Schildt / Res
ffer IP-related incentives (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006; Levine
nd Prietula, 2014). In other words, in open data initiatives which,
nlike traditional ﬁrm-sponsored contract research, are strongly
ligned with academic conventions, ﬁrms may  struggle to persuade
cientists to work on ﬁrm-deﬁned priorities rather than their own
ersonal research agendas.
Extant research provides limited insight into how ﬁrms can
ddress these challenges. The literature on research partnerships
etween ﬁrms and universities is largely focused on contexts with
raditional, IP-centred appropriation mechanisms in place (Link
nd Scott, 2005; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2007) but says little about
ow open data partnerships ought to be structured and governed.3
n this paper, we therefore address the following research question:
hat partnership characteristics enable ﬁrms to beneﬁt from open
ata collaboration with academic researchers?
To explore how ﬁrms overcome the challenges of open data
nitiatives, we examined the structures and practices of an interna-
ional life sciences partnership. We  present an inductive study of
he Structural Genomics Consortium (SGC) which led an open data
rogramme involving ﬁrms and academic scientists. Supported
y charity, government and industry funding, the SGC brought
ogether pharmaceutical ﬁrms including GlaxoSmithKline, Novar-
is and Merck, with the Universities of Toronto and Oxford, and
he Karolinska Institutet (Stockholm). The SGC’s mandate was  to
etermine the three-dimensional shape of proteins and release this
nowledge into the public domain without restriction. This infor-
ation is seen as vital to the discovery of new drugs to combat
ommon human diseases, including cancer, diabetes and inﬂam-
ation.
We draw on our empirical analysis to develop a grounded model
f open data in university–industry partnerships. We  propose that
pen data university–industry partnerships that are structured as
oundary organizations (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008) are partic-
larly adept at generating productive outcomes while mitigating
rms’ challenges. Boundary organizations accomplish this via two
ore mechanisms: mediated revealing and the enabling of multiple
oals. The former allows ﬁrms to reveal their research problems to
xternal problem solvers in a way that reduces the threat of unin-
ended knowledge disclosure and simultaneously allows them to
hape the collective research agenda. In turn, by enabling multiple
oals – in this case the concurrent pursuit of both industrial and aca-
emic goals – the boundary organization broadens the objectives
nd activities of the partnership so they align with the ambitions
nd professional practices of academic researchers which in turn
elps to ensure their participation.
Our ﬁndings contribute to previous work by considering the
mplications of open data for both the rationales underpinning
esearch partnerships between ﬁrms and universities and ques-
ions of organization design. In particular, we demonstrate the role
hat boundary organizations can play in orchestrating industry-
nformed, large scale scientiﬁc work that has the potential to
dvance and transform the knowledge commons from which
cience-based sectors draw.
. Open data in university–industry partnerships
Open data partnerships provide universal and free access to
esearch outputs including results, data and sometimes materials
Murray-Rust, 2008; Molloy, 2011). The open data approach is in
ontrast not only to commercial emphasis on intellectual property
ights, but even to classic open science in which only the ﬁnal
3 The phenomenon we refer to as ‘open data’ has also been labelled ‘open
ource science’ or ‘open access research’ (Munos, 2006; Edwards, 2008; Gowers
nd  Nielsen, 2009; Hope, 2009; Melese et al., 2009).Policy 44 (2015) 1133–1143
outputs are shared (Boudreau and Lakhani 2015; Franzoni and
Sauermann, 2013). Various scientiﬁc communities have recently
adopted increasing openness, including the free sharing of data on
which outputs are based (Reichman et al., 2011).
This development was partly spurred by the increasingly
widespread use of computer code and large datasets which makes
the large-scale sharing of data both feasible and economical
(Boulton et al., 2011). The same technological affordance has
facilitated ‘crowd science’ experiments where problem solving is
pursued by a large number of dispersed contributors (Franzoni and
Sauermann, 2013). Particularly in the life sciences, a further driver
of open data is the trend towards larger scale initiatives designed to
address the complex, interconnected nature of biological systems
which has tested the limits of the traditional small-scale approach
in biology, centred around individual investigators (Swierstra et al.,
2013). The Human Genome Project (HGP) absorbed $3b of funding
and used an open data approach to facilitate coordination across
thousands of researchers around the world, and the subsequent
exploitation of the generated knowledge (Wellcome Trust, 2003).
Similarly, the Census of Marine Life project resulted in the Ocean
Biogeographic Information System (OBIS) database, the world’s
largest open access repository of marine life data (Vermeulen et al.,
2013).
The sharing of data in areas such as genetics, clinical trials
and climate science is supported by various types of stakeholders,
including research funding organizations, patient groups, interest
groups and not least academic scientists themselves. They argue
that open data enables scientiﬁc communities to validate and sub-
stantiate the results of previous research and thereby enhance its
quality, particularly in areas where conﬂicts of interests are at play
such as pharmaceutical research (Washburn, 2008).
Below, we  ﬁrst contrast the new open data approaches with tra-
ditional approaches in university–industry collaboration and then
outline the speciﬁc challenges that open data collaborative initia-
tives create for for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
2.1. Research partnerships between ﬁrms and universities
Research partnerships are innovation-based relationships
focusing on joint research and development (R&D) activities
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Firms engage in research partnerships
because they allow investments in the creation of new knowledge
to be shared across multiple participants. They also provide ﬁrms
with access to complementary knowledge, broaden the scope of
their R&D, and create new investment options in high-risk con-
texts (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Perkmann et al., 2011). Especially in
science-intensive sectors such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
universities represent important partners and sources of innova-
tion for ﬁrms (Mansﬁeld, 1991; Cohen et al., 2002). Firms tend to
view university research as complementary (rather than substitu-
tive) to internal R&D (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Hall et al., 2001).
Access to key personnel represents an additional important motive
for ﬁrms to work with academia, resulting both in “information
gifts” from highly specialized academics as well as opportunities
for hiring students and staff (Hagedoorn et al., 2000).
Partnerships are not without challenges. Chief amongst these
is the concern that a ﬁrm may struggle in appropriating the
knowledge outputs generated in the partnership (Teece, 1986).
Compared to inter-ﬁrm partnerships, such concerns are even
more pronounced in university–industry partnerships (Hagedoorn
et al., 2000). There are two aspects to this problem. First, ﬁrms’
efforts to appropriate knowledge arising from partnerships may
be misaligned with open science practice. Academics may  prefer
generating publishable research output and contest the formal
requirements involved in creating protected knowledge assets
(Murray, 2010). At the very least, this may  lead to an uneasy
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which is suitable for the in-depth exploration of phenomena
that are not well understood (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data collection
involved studying archival documents, interviewing and observa-M. Perkmann, H. Schildt / Res
o-existence of open publishing and intellectual property protec-
ion (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). Second, partnerships involving
niversities often attract grants from government or charities.
his means that the universities will in most jurisdictions make
wnership claims over intellectual property generated (Kenney
nd Patton, 2009). Regulations such as the Bayh–Dole Act in the
nited States stipulate that universities can claim IP ownership
ver outcomes from government funded research (Mowery et al.,
001). In such a context, the higher the share of public funding
n a partnership, the more pronounced ﬁrms’ concerns about
ppropriation will become (Hall et al., 2001).
Firms respond in several ways to the appropriability challenges
ertaining to partnerships with universities (Panagopoulos, 2003).
irst, ﬁrms tend to prefer larger collaborations when public part-
ers are involved. In this case, appropriability has already been
iminished because the presence of a larger number of private and
ublic partners not only stipulates the shared ownership of intellec-
ual property, but also increases the risk of unintended knowledge
pill-overs (Link and Scott, 2005). Also, participation in larger part-
erships carries a reduced cost, and hence implies an improved
alance between risks and rewards (Saez et al., 2002). Second, ﬁrms
re often given the ﬁrst right of refusal for licencing intellectual
roperty arising from a partnership (Perkmann and West, 2015).
irms can access the results from joint research with conditions
hat were determined ex-ante, implying a reduction of uncertainty
elating to the appropriation of partnership outputs. Third, ﬁrms
ay  choose partnerships in ‘pre-competitive’ areas where intel-
ectual property appropriation is less important than alternative
eneﬁts, such as the development of new areas of expertise (Powell
t al., 1996).
Extant research on university–industry partnerships has mostly
ocused on the question of “primary” appropriability, that is the
ontrol and ownership of intellectual property created within the
artnership (Ahuja et al., 2013). This focus is mirrored in univer-
ities’ efforts to assert ownership of the outputs from research
ollaborations (Kenney and Patton, 2009). Against this background,
e lack insight into the beneﬁts accruing to ﬁrms from partner-
hips that entirely relinquish intellectual property in the ﬁrst place.
or ﬁrms, open data policies pose a conundrum: On the one hand,
he absence of intellectual property rights makes it difﬁcult to gain
eturns to investments, yet on the other hand the sheer scale of
hese collaborative efforts makes them too important to ignore,
articularly if large numbers of scientists are potentially available
o work on topics of interest to ﬁrms. Next, we discuss the consider-
tions relevant for ﬁrms with respect to participation in open data
nitiatives.
.2. Challenges facing ﬁrms in open data research partnerships
Compared to conventional research partnerships, open data
artnerships pose two signiﬁcant problems which may  temper
rms’ motivation to engage in such initiatives. The ﬁrst is that of
evealing; the more a ﬁrm attempts to align the efforts in an open
ata research programme with its R&D priorities, the more it will
ave to reveal about the problems it is addressing within its pro-
rietary R&D. Revealing has both advantages and disadvantages for
rms – they may  beneﬁt from revealing problems or solutions as
his may  allow them to shape the collaborative behaviour of others,
nd thereby enhance their competitive position (Alexy et al., 2013).
uch beneﬁts have been documented for various contexts, includ-
ng mining during the industrial revolution, 19th century iron
roduction, and contemporary embedded Linux software (Allen,
983; Nuvolari, 2004; Henkel, 2006). Revealing information about
heir technologies may  also discourage others from competing
n the same technology areas (Clarkson and Toh, 2010). Yet, by
uiding the academic community to address speciﬁc scientiﬁcPolicy 44 (2015) 1133–1143 1135
problems, a ﬁrm discloses information about its active R&D areas
to its competitors (Arrow, 1971; Cohen et al., 2000). Overall, in
an open data scenario, while an excessive degree of ‘problem
revealing’ (Alexy et al., 2013) may  lead to imitation by competi-
tors, an insufﬁcient degree of problem revealing may  impair the
ﬁrm’s ability to steer the alignment of outside knowledge with its
R&D activities.
The second issue facing ﬁrms in open data is an incentive
problem. How can ﬁrms encourage individuals operating within
distributed scientiﬁc communities to participate in their open data
programmes? The success of the open data approach relies on moti-
vating self-organizing groups of scientists to focus their research
efforts on topics of interest to the ﬁrm in the absence of effective
hierarchical control (Murray and O’Mahony, 2007). Since academic
scientists are embedded in the academic status hierarchy and
career system that differs considerably from private sector R&D,
monetary incentives are unlikely to be effective. The primary objec-
tive for many participating researchers will be to improve their
standing and position in their chosen academic community, even
at the expense of pursuing commercially valuable opportunities or
personal monetary gains (D’Este and Perkmann, 2011). An open
data initiative will have to provide suitable incentives that are
aligned with academic scientists’ desire to be rewarded for their
work within their respective communities.
Having outlined the challenges for ﬁrms arising in open data
partnerships, in this study we will explore how they should be
organized to enable ﬁrms to address the challenges while garnering
beneﬁts from the partnership.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Site: the Structural Genomics Consortium
We studied the Structural Genomics Consortium, a major ini-
tiative with laboratories at the Universities of Oxford and Toronto,
and the Karolinska Institutet (Stockholm), established in 2004.
The consortium was funded by the Wellcome Trust, pharmaceuti-
cal companies GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis and Merck, government
organizations, and several smaller foundations. The Wellcome
Trust is one the world’s largest medical research foundations, and
the participating ﬁrms were in ﬁrst, third, and sixth position respec-
tively, for global market share of prescription drugs in 2012.4 The
SGC’s objective was  to identify the three-dimensional shape of
thousands of human proteins with potential relevance for drug
discovery. The physical shape of proteins affects how they inter-
act with other molecules in the human body. Thus, knowledge of
proteins’ structural characteristics can aid the discovery of new
drugs and exploration of the molecular mechanisms that underpin
them.
The pharmaceutical industry provides an ideal setting to study
how ﬁrms implement open data initiatives and overcome their
challenges. Because in this sector proprietary intellectual property
has traditionally played a strong role, potential tensions arising
from open data were likely to be particularly accentuated.
3.2. Data collection
We used an inductive, qualitative approach to study the SGCtion. Our archival documents were drawn from the ofﬁcial minutes
4 Source: IMS  Health.
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Table 1
Representative quotes grouped according to second-order codes.
Enabling ﬁrms’ inﬂuence
on research agenda
‘The real beneﬁt to industry is the ability to nominate targets. That’s the beneﬁt that is unique to funders’ [pharma sponsor]
‘What the SGC does is the sort of work I would love to have done in my department, but I knew that it was much earlier phase in the
drug discovery process, and it’s much higher risk, and there’s much more of it to do. We  couldn’t fund this work internally, but I
wanted the results of the SGC because I would then be able to pick up particular items of interest and then use them internally’
[pharma sponsor]
Maintaining conﬁdentiality ‘It was noted that Board members should maintain conﬁdentiality between the SGC and Funders’ [board member]
‘It  was noted that the issue of conﬁdentiality of the target list is a signiﬁcant issue for us’ [pharma sponsor]
‘Knowing that the structure is solved means we  can reproduce it and we  have a better starting point. The fact that the SGC keeps this
to  a very small number of people means we have zero risk, essentially, that our list would go to a competitor’ [Pharma sponsor]
‘The SGC maintains the Target List as conﬁdential information; neither consortium members nor the public are aware of the proteins
on  the Target List’ [SGC ofﬁcial communication].
Promoting academic goals ‘The SGC Oxford asked the Scientiﬁc Committee for a recommendation to the Board for publication of the draft manuscript by Smith
et  al. This would reveal the identity and screening data of a number of kinases (. . .). The Scientiﬁc Committee agreed’ [archival].
‘The Scientiﬁc Committee supports the request to the Board for approval to release for publication, an article containing information
regarding protein kinase targets whose structures have not been solved. The Scientiﬁc Committee considered that the beneﬁts of
releasing the information far out-weighted the likely impact of releasing such information.’ [archival]
‘There’s some latitude, and the groups themselves have some capability to do their own research. . . . [Targets] are not prescribed
down to “these have to all have to be done and none others”. . . . There’s some latitude that can allow both scientiﬁc curiosity’ [SGC
management].
‘Even though the primary focus of the SGC is to deliver structures, there is still an expectation by the community that the SGC should
publish in peer reviewed journals’. [SGC management]
Adopting academic
practices
‘SGC scientists are all employees of the University of Toronto. A majority of the principal investigators have applied for what’s called
status  only appointment in some of the academic departments and that allows them to apply for other grants if they wish to and
participate in the academic life of the department (. . .) It’s a great way to keep a foot in those doors, if you will, and a foot in both
camps’. [scientist].
udy th
tors’. 
o
t
p
a
o
i
A
t
1
s
m
o
t
a
g
w
z
a
s
m
a
v
2
r
ﬁ
a
a
m
W
a‘When people collaborate with us or come to st
we  have so many [external academic] collabora
f 16 meetings of key SGC bodies, including the Board of Direc-
ors, held between 2005 and 2007 (see Appendix 1). The minutes
rovide records of the organization’s activities and decisions but
lso allowed the inference of more subjective agendas and interests
f various participants. We  also perused additional SGC documents
ncluding the Memoranda on Articles of Association, the Funding
greement, annual reports, press communications and presenta-
ions. The total word length of all documents is approximately
00,000.
We further conducted 22 semi-structured interviews with SGC
taff, members of the board and the scientiﬁc committee, senior
anagement, and scientists. The interviews covered more than half
f the individuals involved in the governance and management of
he SGC, a sample of the researchers, and an external observer. We
sked informants to provide us with their version of the SGC’s ori-
ins and history as well as their own motives, objectives and role
ithin the consortium. We  also requested they describe key organi-
ational processes, speciﬁcally those relating to aspects of revealing
nd motivation. All but four interviews were recorded and tran-
cribed verbatim (see Appendix 2). Triangulation with archival
eeting minutes allowed us to control for potential self-reporting
nd retrospective bias in the interview evidence.
A third set of data was based on observations and informal con-
ersations in London and Toronto, and by phone, between 2007 and
011. The informal discussions were with SGC managers, sponsors’
epresentatives, and external observers, including some critics. The
rst author attended three SGC workshop held in 2007 and 2011,
nd had numerous informal conversations with participants as well
s outsiders. After each interview or conversation, we  created a
emo,  summarizing insights and exploring avenues for theorizing.
e sought to obtain external validity by triangulating information
cross multiple sources, spanning insiders and outsiders.e project, I think they’re impressed that we’re doing a good job and that’s why
[SGC scientist]
3.3. Data analysis
Our inductive analysis proceeded in several steps. We  ﬁrst gen-
erated a case narrative, depicting the SGC’s operating context, the
organization’s development, and its structures and practices. We
used this account to generate a 3200-word report which we sent to
all interviewees. Two  respondents provided detailed feedback and
corrected factual mistakes while others provided cursory feedback.
Using the qualitative data analysis software, NVivo, we  con-
ducted an initial round of ﬁrst-order (open) coding (Corbin and
Strauss, 2008) on all archival documents, interview transcripts and
memos. Guided by our research question, we coded the activ-
ities of the SGC with respect to how these addressed the key
challenges associated with open data. Examples for ﬁrst-order
codes included ‘pharma members’ ability to nominate targets’ and
‘making allowance for scientiﬁc curiosity’ (see sample extracts in
Table 1). We  validated codes by ensuring they emerged from mul-
tiple instances, otherwise we discarded them.
We next moved to second-order (axial) coding and established
relationships between the open codes by searching for connec-
tions between them. For instance, we grouped the ﬁrst-order codes
‘pharma members’ ability to nominate targets’, and ‘pharma mem-
bers shape SGC strategy to focus on targets relevant for drug
discovery’ to form the second-order category of ‘enabling ﬁrms’
inﬂuence on research agenda’. Throughout, we  constantly moved
backwards and forwards between our evidence and the emerging
categories, helping us to render our results as robust as possible.
Our ﬁnal step was to work our second-order codes that were still
fairly close to the phenomenon into a grounded theory model that
abstracts from the speciﬁcities of our case, and posits theoretical
mechanisms potentially applicable to a wider range of empirical
situations.
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Below, we  ﬁrst present our raw ﬁndings, reﬂecting the results of
ur ﬁrst-order and second-order coding exercise, before presenting
ur grounded model in the subsequent section.
. Findings
.1. History and features of the Structural Genomics Consortium
During the 2000s, there was an increasing recognition in the
harmaceutical industry that its research productivity was  slow-
ng. Despite escalating R&D expenditure, the number of novel
rugs failed to rise proportionately (Paul et al., 2010). ‘Big Pharma’
esponded by reducing R&D expenditure and engaging in external
ollaboration (Garnier, 2008; Schuhmacher et al., 2013). In par-
icular, public–private partnerships appeared attractive as many
ndustry insiders believed that by relying on public science they
ould reduce the high failure rates in drug development (Munos,
009).
The SGC was designed in response to this need. The organization,
ounded in 2003, originated from interactions between Glaxo-
mithKline scientists and ofﬁcials at the Wellcome Trust. Similar to
he Human Genome Project, the research initiative would involve
cademic researchers and attract funding from foundations and
he State. With funding from the Wellcome Trust, GlaxoSmithKline
nd the Canadian and UK governments, the SGC initially operated
aboratories at the Universities of Toronto and Oxford. From the
iewpoint of the charity and government funding organizations,
he initiative was to aid the expansion of the knowledge com-
ons in the pharmaceutical sector. The creation of new, publicly
hared knowledge was expected to underpin the discovery of new
rugs and thereby enhance pharmaceutical companies’ innovative-
ess. Aled Edwards, a Toronto-based academic scientist with prior
nvolvement in several biotechnology start-ups, was nominated
s CEO of the SGC. The organization was governed by a board of
irectors of some 15 individuals who represented the sponsors.
 separate scientiﬁc committee of ten scientists comprising both
ndependent academics and sponsor representatives oversaw all
cientiﬁc decisions.
In 2005, the SGC expanded its activities by establishing a labo-
atory at Karolinska Institutet in Stockholm as a group of Swedish
unders joined as additional sponsors.5 The pharmaceutical compa-
ies, Novartis and Merck also joined as sponsors of the consortium.
ith an annual turnover of around CAD 30m at the time of study,
he organization employed approximately 180 staff with each site
osting several teams led by principal investigators and a chief
cientist.
The consortium practiced an open data approach and deposited
ll newly resolved protein structures in the open Protein Data Bank
PDB), with no advance access given to consortium members. In
oose analogy with open source software, open data was  to facil-
tate a process whereby self-motivated innovators could freely
uild on the work of others (Edwards, 2008). The funders of the
onsortium believed that this approach would accelerate the col-
ective creation of knowledge underpinning the discovery of new
rugs. Edwards warned that ‘the predominant methods of drug
esearch are too patent heavy, leading to duplicated effort and lost
pportunities for signiﬁcant productivity (. . .)  Intellectual property
5 The full list of sponsors at the time of our study includes: The Canada Foun-
ation for Innovation (CFI), The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR),
enome Canada, GlaxoSmithKline plc. (GSK), Karolinska Institutet, The Knut and
lice Wallenberg Foundation, Merck & Co., Inc., Novartis, The Ontario Genomics
nstitute (OGI), The Ontario Ministry of Research and Innovation (MRI), The Swedish
oundation for Strategic Research, VINNOVA (The Swedish Governmental Agency
or Innovation Systems), The Wellcome Trust. The Wellcome Trust was  the largest
ontributor of funding, and the pharmaceutical ﬁrms contributed approx. 5% each.Policy 44 (2015) 1133–1143 1137
is killing the process of drug discovery’ (SGC press communica-
tion). Whilst close interaction with academia had been common
in the pharmaceutical industry for many years (Cockburn et al.,
1999), the SGC model differed from traditional collaboration: par-
ticipants were committed to relinquishing intellectual property
ownership; collaboration among competing pharmaceutical ﬁrms
was emphasized; and research funds were sourced internationally
via an organization that maintained ﬂexible ties with universities.
In Table 2, we provide a summary of the interests held by
each type of consortium participant, and their perceived beneﬁts.
While the table illustrates that the various parties’ agendas partly
diverged, it also shows that each derived beneﬁts from participa-
tion.
We use the term ‘sponsors’ to refer to organizations that pro-
vided funding to the SGC. We  use the term ‘participants’ to refer
to individuals involved in the SGC, including its lead scientists
(CEO and chief scientists), members of the board of directors (the
‘directors’), members of the scientiﬁc committee and the scientists
working for the SGC. When we speak of the SGC as an organizational
actor, we refer to the collective actions of its principal ofﬁcers (the
lead scientists), the directors and the scientiﬁc committee mem-
bers.
4.2. Revealing and conﬁdentiality
As part of our investigation, we  explored how the pharmaceuti-
cal companies aligned SGC’s research with their own  proprietary
R&D activities and the implications this had for their revealing
behaviour. The challenge was to steer the SGC’s work towards areas
of importance to a ﬁrm but simultaneously avoid detailed problem
revealing to the extent that it would beneﬁt competitors (Alexy
et al., 2013). Within the SGC, this challenge was addressed in two
ways. First, the SGC created procedures through which the par-
ticipating ﬁrms could inﬂuence its work programme. Second, the
SGC designed these procedures in a way that restricted information
spill-overs.
4.2.1. Enabling ﬁrms’ inﬂuence on the research agenda
The consortium designed a decision making process that
enabled the pharmaceutical companies, like the other sponsors, to
shape the organization’s research programme. The process entailed
compiling a list of proteins to be resolved by the SGC scientists.
Every sponsor was  allowed to submit a ‘wish list’ of 200 targets of
which 20 could be designated as priorities. The nominations were
examined by the scientiﬁc committee, which produced a master
list of proposed targets for ﬁnal approval by the board. At the time
of our study, the list included a few thousand proteins.
For the pharma companies, the ability to shape the research
agenda was a critical objective. They were keen to focus the SGC’s
work on proteins that were likely to be relevant for human health,
rather than those that were of more general scientiﬁc interest. The
focus on such ‘human targets’ was attractive because of their poten-
tial for informing the development of new drugs.
4.2.2. Maintaining conﬁdentiality
The wish lists proposed by the SGC’s pharma members con-
tained those proteins regarded as important for their R&D activities.
Revealing these lists openly may  have allowed competitors to infer
a company’s R&D priorities. So, despite its insistence on openness in
many other respects, the SGC kept these lists conﬁdential even from
the board of directors and scientiﬁc committee; in this way, a spon-
sor’s interest in a particular protein was never revealed to another
sponsor. The ofﬁce of the CEO combined the individual wish lists
into an anonymous ‘master list’ that was circulated among the
management, board of directors and the scientiﬁc committee.
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Table 2
Summary of SGC participants’ interests and perceived beneﬁts.
Participants Interests and goals Beneﬁts from SGC
Firms Exploitation of scientiﬁc knowledge for development of
commercially viable drugs
Cost-effective discovery of new drugs
Inﬂuence on generation of public knowledge on proteins
relevant to drug discovery
Access to subsidies from charities and governments
Academics Peer recognition and career advancement through
peer-reviewed articles
Participation in state-of-the-art programme on previously
uncharacterized proteins
Opportunities for conducting follow-on research on these
proteins
Charitable research foundations Advancement of human health by enabling projects not
supported by the market
Development of knowledge commons underpinning drug
discovery and thus human health
Solicit industry input on promising directions of work
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As an additional safeguard, the master list was not publicly dis-
losed. Only when a target protein was resolved was  its structural
nformation openly deposited, but the identity of proteins that the
onsortium failed to resolve was never disclosed. The conﬁdential-
ty requirements also extended to parties collaborating with SGC
cientists and external collaborators were required to sign a conﬁ-
entiality agreement. The conﬁdentiality formula was  regarded as
 decisive beneﬁt by the private-sector sponsors, particularly with
espect to a small number of high-priority targets. The presence of
his rule meant that pharma members were prepared to entrust the
onsortium with more of their sensitive high priority targets, than
ad the wish lists or the master list been publicly disclosed.
The conﬁdentiality formula was maintained even though it was
riticized by some academic outsiders. Because it was  not known
hich proteins the SGC was working on, these individuals feared
hat they may  be expending parallel effort on resolving the same
roteins and that the SGC would likely succeed in doing so ﬁrst
ecause of its economies of scale. Even in the face of such criticism,
he SGC leadership maintained that this trade-off was necessary in
rder to maintain the partnership with corporate sponsors. Excep-
ions to the conﬁdentiality formula were only made when the
ublic interest overrode conﬁdentiality concerns, as for instance
hen targets related to malaria were prioritized for global health
mpact, or when the information was an essential part of journal
rticles to be imminently published.
.3. Motivating academic researchers
The SGC pursued several strategies for attracting academic sci-
ntists to participate in its endeavour. Some of these were aimed at
he SGC-internal scientist community while others were tailored
or engagement with external scientists.
.3.1. Promoting academic goals
The SGC encouraged its academic workforce to engage in
esearch beyond mapping the proteins on the master list. Such
ctivities were not always aligned with sponsoring ﬁrms’ interests,
ut facilitated the career progression of participants and increased
he prominence of SGC as a research institution.
First, SGC scientists were encouraged to pursue ‘follow-on’
esearch on the characterized proteins and publish results in peer-
eviewed articles. This meant studying how they linked to and
eacted with other molecules, such as inhibitors. The investigation
f these mechanisms was seen in the academic community as more
emanding and interesting, than resolving the protein structures
er se. On one occasion, the SGC leadership reduced the amount
f proteins to be resolved by 15% each quarter. This measure was
nacted to ‘enable [the SGC staff] to utilize their intellects fully’ by
ncreasing the time at their disposal to pursue personal research
rogrammes, and thus achieve ‘higher overall scientiﬁc impact’ ofcial impact Generate basis for wide-ranging follow-on research
supporting human wellbeing and economic growth
Development of scientiﬁc talent in national economy
the SGC (d4). This was thought to improve staff retention because
it enabled the researchers to publish more high impact articles and
thereby improve their career prospects in academia.
Second, the SGC allowed the scientists to tackle proteins that
were not on the master list, even though the SGC had solicited
suggestions from the academic community when it compiled the
list. The freedom to explore structures outside the master list was
granted when it promised to add ‘signiﬁcantly to scientiﬁc under-
standing’ with a prospect of academic publications. At one site, 17
of its 114 resolved structures were outside the master list and had
been chosen by the researchers themselves. These structures were
of less immediate interest to drug discovery but of more general
scientiﬁc relevance. In effect, the SGC provided its scientists with
organizational slack so they could pursue their scientiﬁc curiosity,
leading not only to publications, but also to increased knowledge
and capabilities.
4.3.2. Adopting academic practices
The SGC sought to emulate core features of academic envi-
ronments even though strictly speaking it was autonomous from
academia. The SGC did not employ researchers directly but dis-
bursed funds to universities so they could in turn employ the
researchers using terms and conditions familiar in academic con-
texts. The SGC also sponsored academic activities, such as seminars
and visiting scholarships, it actively encouraged collaboration
between its scientists and other researchers at its own  university
sites and in other universities (i16). In September 2009, SGC Oxford
had 70 collaborating researchers and SGC Toronto had 37 active
collaborations (d23). The SGC also ensured its staff could obtain
honorary appointments within the respective departments at the
universities hosting the SGC laboratories. The academic outlook of
the organization was  reinforced by the fact that while industrial
sponsors shaped the overall work agenda through their boardroom
representation, they had minimal impact on the day-to-day pursuit
of the research.
Overall, the design of the SGC as an autonomous organization
meant that it was able to provide a work context that differed lit-
tle from traditional academic settings. By using these practices, the
SGC could attract high calibre researchers who used their employ-
ment to underpin a career in mainstream academia. The important
overall insight is that the SGC achieved this by broadening the
agenda from a pure industrial focus to accommodate both indus-
trial and academic goals.
5. A model of open data partnerships between ﬁrms and
universitiesThe Structural Genomics Consortium shares many features
with organizations characterized in previous literature as bound-
ary organizations. These stand between parties with divergent
M. Perkmann, H. Schildt / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1133–1143 1139
Parcipang sciensts 
Boundary 
organizaon
Firms
Public/social 
scie nce fund ers
Fund
Shape agenda; 
reveal problems
Wider  scie nﬁc 
comm unity
Solicit 
support
Collaborate 
with 
Enables mulple 
goals
Universi es
Fund s
Employ
Mediated revealing 
of problems
Produ ce publi c knowle dge;  
ﬁts agenda shaped by ﬁrms
 unive
i
a
t
d
n
o
5
w
F
d
t
a
w
t
t
l
i
t
b
r
W
t
b
T
t
t
f
p
5
b
p
a
(
i
t
eIn bold: key mechanisms
Fig. 1. Model of open data in
nterests and allow them to collaborate (Guston, 2001; O’Mahony
nd Bechky, 2008; Miller, 2001; Howells, 2006). They provide solu-
ions to governance problems in situations where parties with
ifferent interests interact (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008). In the
ext section, we use our ﬁndings to develop a model of boundary
rganizations in the speciﬁc context of open data partnerships.
.1. Mechanisms enabled by the boundary organization
Generalizing our ﬁndings, we identify two key mechanisms by
hich boundary organizations enable open data partnerships (see
ig. 1). The ﬁrst is ‘mediated revealing’, which involves an interme-
iary to aggregate and anonymize information before it is passed on
o a different party. The SGC aggregated ﬁrms’ wish lists of proteins,
nd compiled a master list for the scientists that did not disclose
hich target was nominated by whom. Through this mechanism
he ﬁrms fundamentally shaped the direction of work pursued by
he academic researchers in the consortium and their external col-
aborators’, without revealing which proteins speciﬁcally they were
nterested in. Previous work has pointed out that ﬁrms use ‘selec-
ive revealing’ (Henkel, 2006; Alexy et al., 2013) as a means of
alancing the beneﬁts of disclosing information to externals and the
isk for this information to be adversely used by their competitors.
hile in selective revealing ﬁrms’ information is directly exposed
o rivals, mediated revealing establishes an additional safeguard
y inserting a boundary organization between ﬁrms and externals.
his arrangement enables ﬁrms to disclose information to externals
hat may  be too sensitive to be disclosed directly can be disclosed
o an intermediary. This in turn increases the potential beneﬁts
rom revealing as ﬁrms are prepared to share their more important
roblems.
.1.1. Mediated revealing
Mediated revealing requires that the interacting parties trust the
oundary organization. Trust refers to the conﬁdence the involved
arties have that an actor will adhere to mutually agreed lines of
ction (Nooteboom, 1996). The concept of ‘trusted intermediary’
Rai et al., 2008) aptly encapsulates the speciﬁc role of the SGC. In
nformation systems, trusted intermediaries allow system owners
o ensure that certain types of information are separated from oth-
rs (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004). The SGC played an equivalent role byrsity–industry partnerships.
brokering information between ﬁrms and academic researchers.
Like many trusted intermediaries, its mission was  conﬁned to pur-
suing a speciﬁc objective – managing an open data research agenda.
By conﬁning its activities to this focused objective, and keeping
its distance from the organizations involved, the SGC succeeded in
acquiring trust.
The kind of boundary organization characterized above shares
some features with specialized innovation intermediaries that
‘crowd-source’ problem solutions via broadcast search and inno-
vation contests (Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010) or orchestrate the
trading of knowledge (Dushnitsky and Klueter, 2011). Like the SGC,
these intermediaries may  anonymise the identity of the problem
owner and they are trusted by the revealing parties. However, they
do not practice open data and often require the problem solvers to
assign their rights to the problem owner for a reward. Unlike these
entities, boundary organizations engaged in open data initiatives
face the additional challenge of having to engage potential inno-
vators by offering non- monetary incentives. This consideration
connects with issues of motivation addressed below.
5.1.2. Enabling multiple goals
The second key mechanism consists in enabling multiple goals.
In an open data scenario, ﬁrm beneﬁts from openly generated scien-
tiﬁc knowledge will depend on whether they can pique the interest
of academic researchers in the topics they propose. We  suggest that
boundary organizations can accomplish this by enabling multiple
goals to be pursued in the context of the collaboration. While for
many of the SGC’s activities the interests of academia and industry
were aligned because the scientiﬁcally interesting proteins were
also those likely to inform drug discovery, the SGC allowed some
activities to be of purely academic interest. In other words, while
goals sometimes overlapped, this was not always and not neces-
sarily the case.
The SGC resolved goal conﬂicts by allowing multiple goals to
co-exist instead of optimizing its activities and costs around either
purely industrial or purely academic goals. The SGC pursued the
sponsor ﬁrms’ primary goal of mapping the protein structures
but also encouraged the pursuit of goals concomitant with aca-
demic science research driven by curiosity and academic publishing
(Owen-Smith, 2003). Goal co-existence allowed the SGC to attract
high-calibre academic scientists and, as a second-order beneﬁt,
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elped it connect with academic collaborators further aﬁeld. While
he concurrent pursuit of multiple partially incompatible goals may
e seen as ineffective (Simon, 1964), it allows a boundary organiza-
ion to garner more ﬁnancial resources and access a wider spectrum
f human capital.
Boundary organizations are well suited to enable the parallel
ursuit and alignment of separate goals because their intersti-
ial position allows them to manage operations by maintaining
he social boundaries between the different participants, thereby
voiding potential conﬂicts that could arise from direct coordi-
ation efforts (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). A further beneﬁt of
aintaining social boundaries is that a boundary organization has
 relative prerogative over how resources are allocated and how
roduction is controlled (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008), allowing
or resources to be earmarked for the pursuit of different goals.
inally, boundary organizations are likely to be familiar with the
orms and practices prevalent in the different domains in which
heir stakeholders operate. In our case, this allowed the SGC to
uild organizational procedures that created a context familiar
o academic researchers and simultaneously remain aware of the
ndustrially led priorities advocated by the ﬁrms. While these
apabilities of boundary suggestions have been characterized by
revious research, the novel insight emerging from our study is that
oundary organizations can also act as trusted information brokers
hat aggregate and selectively distribute information. In the case of
he SGC, this function that underpinned mediated revealing was  a
rucial ingredient of the organization’s role in enabling open data
ith industry involvement.
.2. Implications for university–industry partnerships
By coordinating mediated revealing and enabling multiple goals,
oundary organizations such as the SGC provide an organizational
olution to the challenges that ﬁrms face when seeking to insti-
ate and shape large-scale open access initiatives. They help to
ttract high-calibre academic scientists to contribute to scientiﬁc
rand challenges because they can reach a larger ‘workforce’ of aca-
emic researchers than conventional, un-mediated partnerships,
nd thereby achieve enhanced economies of scale. By using the
otential of open data to draw on larger ‘crowds’ of scientists
Franzoni and Sauermann, 2013), ﬁrms may  participate in shap-
ng the knowledge commons of industries or sectors in a way not
chievable by conventional research collaborations.
Previous research has found that participating in the develop-
ent of open science can be an important motive for ﬁrms to
ngage in collaboration with universities (Powell et al., 1996; Cohen
t al., 2002; Murray, 2002; Simeth and Raffo, 2013). Our study
ontributes to this body of work in two ways. First, we provide
 framework for understanding the conditions under which ﬁrms
ould participate in open data which compared to open science
epresents a more radical arrangement in terms of publicly sharing
nformation and results. Second, we emphasize the nexus between
he ﬁrms’ ability to appropriate beneﬁts from public science and
heir ability to shape its course. In face of the generally inverse
elationship between the extent to which ﬁrm shape a research
rogramme and their willingness to share the results publicly, our
odel suggests how boundary organizations can moderate this
elationship in ways that allows ﬁrms greater inﬂuence of pub-
ic research programmes without compromising their commercial
nterests.
There are however boundary conditions that will limit the appli-
ability of open data partnerships. First, the described beneﬁts
ill apply to open data initiatives particularly involving multi-
le ﬁrms. A single ﬁrm wishing to attract academic scientists can
nsure conﬁdentiality by setting up suitable contracts with spe-
iﬁc universities or groups of universities. When several ﬁrms arePolicy 44 (2015) 1133–1143
involved, however, they face the challenge of having to disclose
potentially sensitive information to each other. Here a bound-
ary organization provides an organizational solution that protects
ﬁrms’ sensitive information from being disclosed to each other.
The more competitive the research context is, the more relevant
boundary organizations and mediated revealing will become for
accomplishing joint open data initiatives.
In contrast with proprietary research collaboration, the ability to
beneﬁt from open data is particularly contingent upon time-based
competition and superior complementary assets (Teece, 1986). In
the case of the Structural Genomics Consortium, the pharmaceuti-
cal companies acquiesced to the unrestricted release of knowledge
produced about proteins only because they held downstream assets
for exploiting this knowledge. Complementary assets availability
represents a boundary condition for ﬁrm participation in open data
initiatives, implying that the formula used by the SGC will apply
primarily to basic science initiatives. For open access to advance
further down the R&D value chain, boundary organizations will
have to offer additional quid-pro-quos to participating ﬁrms, such
as advance access to research results or commercial control over
parts of the knowledge being generated. Future research should
examine under what conditions and organizational terms ﬁrms will
engage in open data collaborations that are more applied than the
basic science oriented collaboration studied here.
From the viewpoint of charitable and governmental research
funders, our study suggests that large scale open data initiatives do
not have to be purely public but can be extended to public–private
partnerships. It is by now accepted that new models of collabo-
ration in the wake of the Human Genome Project, using ‘weak’
intellectual property systems and loose large-scale coordination
offer pathways to enhance the overall societal impact of public sci-
ence certainly within its own  boundaries (Rhoten and Powell, 2008;
Rai et al., 2008; Kenney and Patton, 2009). In this way, they can mit-
igate the delay or reduction of follow-on academic research and
product innovation caused by the presence of intellectual property
protection (Murray and Stern, 2007; Williams, 2010).
Our study not only demonstrates that the beneﬁt of enhanced
cumulative innovation provided by open data can be achieved even
when for-proﬁt ﬁrms are involved. Furthermore, one may  plausi-
bly argue that the involvement of industrial partners increases the
relevance of the science produced for tackling societal challenges
such as the development of new drugs. While industry often fails
to cover areas of societal need – as exempliﬁed by the failure in
orphan drugs – the involvement of science users in shaping the
agenda for scientiﬁc challenges will promote the creation of knowl-
edge potentially instrumental for developing future innovations.
Simultaneously, the risk of publicly funded research being captured
by particular industry interests is reduced because no intellectual
property is produced and no privileged access to research results is
provided. In this sense, the SGC exempliﬁes a way  in which large-
scale, decentralized and open scientiﬁc collaborations can be made
more impactful by involving industry participants.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
The recent “supersizing” of science (Vermeulen, 2010) is likely
to change the parameters under which ﬁrms engage in partner-
ships with universities. The Human Genome Project and other
large-scale life science programmes have demonstrated, inside
science, how the open sharing of data can dramatically increase
the volume and the speed of research. We  consider for the ﬁrst
time how these developments in science may  impact on research
partnerships between ﬁrms and universities. We  suggest that
boundary organizations can be an effective tool for ﬁrms, aca-
demic researchers and science funders to obtain beneﬁts from
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pen data collaboration. Boundary organizations perform medi-
ted revealing, allowing ﬁrms to disclose their research problems
o a broad audience of innovators and shape their research agenda,
nd simultaneously minimize the risk that this information would
e adversely used by competitors. Moreover, by enabling multi-
le goals boundary organizations can attract external innovators to
ollaborations because this allows them to pursue their own goals
nd objectives. By providing a formula for bringing together univer-
ities and industry to pursue big science, boundary organizations
ay  prove an effective tool for helping to advance the knowledge
ommons underpinning science-based industries.
Our study has important implications for policy particularly
s open data has hitherto been primarily used inside public sci-
nce. The Human Genome Project has impressively demonstrated
he power of open, speedy data sharing (Williams, 2010). While
or-proﬁt ﬁrms have been slower to embrace this principle in
heir partnerships with academia, our study offers insight to pol-
cy makers on how to obtain greater participation by industry in
pen data initiatives. From a policy viewpoint, this would result
n two signiﬁcant beneﬁts. First, industrial participation in large-
cale scientiﬁc collaborations can guide scientiﬁc enquiry towards
reater societal relevance. Industrial input into decision-making
n work programmes will likely focus on knowledge creation in
reas expected to contribute to new technologies and products. In
he case of the SGC, for instance, industry’s target lists focused on
hose proteins that were seen as the most likely to contribute to
he discovery of new drugs. From policy makers perspective, this
utcome can be perceived as the expansion of the industry com-
ons because all of the new knowledge created by the partnership
as made openly accessible to all industry participants, includ-
ng those not part of the consortium. Second, involving industry
educes the cost to the public purse of large-scale scientiﬁc collab-
rations as industrial participants can be asked to contribute to the
otal cost. The justiﬁcation for pecuniary contributions is that ﬁrms
hat participate are given the opportunity to shape the direction
f research to be conducted within an open data consortium, and
ence can be expected to leverage their complementary assets to
xploit the generated knowledge even though it is released into the
ublic domain.
Given the potential beneﬁts, our insights on the mechanisms
or open data may  provide policy makers, as well as managers in
cience-intensive ﬁrms, with a possible blueprint for organizing
ublic–private research partnerships. Much of the public support
or industry involvement in academic science currently directly
ubsidizes projects between ﬁrms and universities. These are often
elatively small-scale projects and are also likely to involve intel-
ectual property provisions. Support for open data initiatives led by
oundary organizations such as the SGC has the potential to con-
iderably amplify the societal beneﬁts from government subsidies
ecause (a) initiatives can be larger-scale as they can more eas-
ly involve multiple universities and (b) open data principles can
e more easily negotiated (with ﬁrms as well as universities) by
pecialist boundary organizations.
cknowledgements
We  are grateful for comments by our editor Martin Kenney,
he anonymous reviewers, as well as Oliver Alexy, Eva Boxen-
aum, Giuseppe Delmestri, Lars Frederiksen, Gerry George, Joachim
enkel, Ilze Kivleniece, Matt Kraatz, Tom Lawrence, Mike Louns-
ury, Anita McGahan, Maureen McKelvey, Woody Powell, Joel
est and Mike Wright. Previous versions were presented at the
cademy of Management Meeting 2014, the European Group of
rganization Studies Colloquium 2014, the ABC Research Network
onference 2012, a meeting of the Organization Theory Research
roup (OTREG) and seminars at the universities of Gothenburg, LinzPolicy 44 (2015) 1133–1143 1141
and Nottingham. Markus Perkmann acknowledges funding from
the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) via an AIM
Fellowship (RES-331-27-0063).
Appendix 1. List of meeting minutes and other archival
documents
Code Date Title Word length
d1 01/02/05 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
Minutes
5406
d2  02/08/05 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
Minutes
4838
d3  07/02/06 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
Minutes
4370
d4  02/05/06 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
Minutes
4273
d5  30/05/06 Audit and Risk Meeting
Minutes
982
d6 06/06/06 Board Meeting Minutes 1151
d7  31/06/06 Business Committee Meeting
Minutes
1346
d8  06/08/06 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
minutes
3651
d9  05/09/06 Business Committee Meeting
Minutes
522
d10  05/09/06 Board Meeting Minutes 2991
d11 07/11/06 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
Minutes
3451
d12  05/12/06 Board Meeting Minutes 3107
d13 06/02/07 Scientiﬁc Committee Meeting
Minutes
3192
d14  06/03/07 Board Meeting Minutes 2656
d15 30/04/07 Board Meeting Minutes 1754
d16 05/07/07 Board Meeting Minutes 2126
d17 05/07/07 Memorandum Articles of
Association
9781
d18 31/05/07 Funding Agreement 18,516
d19 11/05/09 Presentation by SGC lead
scientist 1
d20 2003–09 SGC press communications 1889
d21 29/09/11 Presentation by SGC lead
scientist 1
d22 09/2009 Commentary by SGC scientists
in Nature Chemical Biology
4481
d23 2009–12 SGC website
d24 17/2/11 Economist intelligence unit 824
d25 29/09/11 Presentation by SGC lead
scientist 2
d26 14/3/07 Presentations by SGC lead
scientist 3
d27 12/3/07 Presentation by SGC scientist
Appendix 2. List of interviews and recorded duration in
minutes
No. Date Afﬁliation Description ′
i1 28/11/07 Pharma member Face to face, UK 80
i2  13/11/07 SGC lead scientist Face to face, UK 37
i3  20/12/07 SGC lead scientist Phone 60a
i4 07/02/08 Pharma member Phone 49
i5  11/02/08 Foundation member Face to face, UK 54
i6  13/02/08 Pharma member Phone 48
i7  15/02/08 Pharma member Phone 55
i8  25/02/08 Pharma member Phone 51
i9  25/03/08 SGC scientist Phone 60
i10 11/02/08 Foundation member Face to face, UK 30
i11 23/06/08 SGC lead scientist Face to face,
Canada
78
i12 23/06/08 SGC scientist Face to face,
Canada
50i13 23/06/08 Government sponsor Face to face,
location
undisclosed
64
i14 23/06/08 SGC scientist Face to face,
Canada
59
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ppendix 2 (Continued )
No. Date Afﬁliation Description ′
i15 03/12/08 SGC lead scientist Phone 48
i16 23/11/09 SGC lead scientist Face-to-face,
UK
120a
i17 07/04/10 SGC lead scientist Phone 69
i18 08/04/10 Sponsor representative Face-to-face,
UK
120a
i19 10/05/10 Sponsor representative Phone 45
i20 04/06/10 Foundation member Face-to-face,
UK
65
i21 15/09/11 External scientist Face-to-face,
UK
60
i22 21/09/11 SGC scientist Phone, UK 30a
a Interviews based on notes rather than recordings at the request of interviewees.
ll  interviewees were assured that their identity would remain conﬁdential.
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